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of a warehouse in the midst of the city could store in it quantities of
gunpowder, he might save the expense of transportation and storage at
a distant point. If a landlord could let his building for a small-pox
hospital or a slaughter-house, he might obtain an increased rent. If a
railroad company is permitted to run its cars through the streets of a
city propelled by steam, it might be less expensive and more convenient
than if the same were drawn by horses. hut all these are restrained,
not because the public have occasion to make the like u.e, or make any
use of the property, or to take any benefit or profit to themselves tbr it,
but because it would be a noxious use, contralry to the maxim, ,Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non lwdas. It is not an appropriation of' the property
to public use. but the restraint of an injurious private use by the owner,
and is therefore not within the principle of property taken under the
right of eminent domain. This distinction is manifest in principle,
and is recognised by unquestioned authority : Commoincealth v. Alger,
7 Cush. 53 ; Commonwealth v. Ticiksley. 11 Met. 55 ; B,,ker v. Bostoni,
12 Pick. 184 ; Walleigh v. Giilman,. 12 Me. 403 ; I'id rbilt v. Adlams,
7 Cowen 349; Cowles v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cowen 585; 1
Dillon on Corporations, § 93, pp. 209, 210 ; 2 Id., § 565, and cases there
cited.
I am of opinion, for the reasons given, that the ordinance complained
of is within the scope and power of municipal authority ; that this
power has not been unreasonably or oppressively exercised; that the
ordinance merely preventing the use of locomotives on the streets does
not impair the obligation of any contract, nor violate the chartered
rights or any essential franchise of the railroad company; and that it
is therefore valid and of full force and effect.
The judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
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ACTION.

Promise to pay Debt of Anotlher--Estoppel.-In an action to recover a
debt which the defendant agreed with a third party to pay the plaintiff,
'it is a good defence to show that before the plaintiff assented to, or acted
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 22 of his Reports.

2 From Henry A. Chaney, Esq., and Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter. Cases decided at October Term 1875. The volume in which they will be reported cannot
yet be indicated.
3 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Ohio State Reports.
4 From Hou. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 38 Wisconsin Reports.
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on the promise made in his favor, the agreement had been rescinded:
r'mible v. Strother, 25 Ohio.
In such case, where the plaintiff has not been induced to alter his
position by relying, in good faith, on the promise made in his favor, the
defendant is not estopped from setting up any defence which he could
have set up against the enforcement of the contract by the other contracting party : Id.
AD.1IRALTY. See Lis Pendens.
Mritime Lien-Jursdictionqf State Courts-HomePort.-A lien exists under the maritime law far supplies furnished to a vessel in the port
of a state in which her owner does not reside: Dowell & Bowmau et al.
v. Goode, 25 Ohio.
. A suit in rent against the vessel to enforce such lien, cannot be mainjurisdiction in such case being
tained in a state court, the exclusive
United States : P.
vested in the courts of the
For the purpose of ascertaining whether such lien exists, the home
port of the vessel is to be determined by the residence of the owner, and
not by the place of her enrolment: Id.
Where a vessel was furnished with supplies at the port of Cincinnati,
the place of her enrolment, no owner residing in this state, the right
to assert a maritime lien against the vessel, fbr such supplies, is not
affected by the fact that one of the owners of the vessel resided in the
adjoining city of Covington, in the state of Kentucky: Id.
ASSUMPSIT.

An action of assumpsit against parties jointly, fails if there is no
evidence of a joint liability or understanding on their part: .Mace v.
Paye, S. C. Mich.
-

ATTACHM ENT.

Pendency of Attachment in another State.-In an action to recover
money due on contract, it is a sufficient defence to show that the money
souglt to be recovered has been attached by process of garnishment duly
issued by a court of a sister state, in an action there prosecuted against
the plaintiff by his creditors, although it appear that the plaintiff and
such creditors are all residents of this state: Baltimore and 0hio Railroad Co. v. ty, 25 Ohio.
ATTORNEY.

The mayor or councilman of a municipality is not bound by his official
position to give to the latter his professional services as a lawyer without
charge : Mayor of Niles v. _Muzzy, S. C. Mich.
BAILMENT.

Denial of Bailor's Title.-One who receives property as bailee or
agent cannot at law deny that his bailor or principal had title to the
property at the time of its delivery to him : Nadd v. Mllontanye, 38
Wis.
Defendants claim to have purchased certain chattels, here in dispute,
from the assignee in bankruptcy of one E., as a part of E.'s estate.
Plaintiffs testify that they purchased said property of E. before he was
adjudged a bankrupt; that some months afterwards they loaned it to
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defendants, to be used and taken care of, and possession to be restored
to plaintiffs when they should request it; and that. defendants" alleged
purchase was made while they were holding the property under such
bailment. Held, that if the facts are so found, defendants cannot claim
title under their said purchase, as against thel plaintiffs : Id.
BA.NKRUPTCY.

The withdrawal of opposition to bankruptcy proceedings already
begun, is a valid consideration for an agreement between petitioning
creditors and the defendants in bankruptcy: ,Sanford v. .uxford, S. C.
Mich.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Partnership.
ParolAgreement ?tz&to Negotiate- Consideration-Estoppelof Maker
as against Holder.-In an action on a promissory note, evidence is inadmissible to show a parol agreement, made when the note was given,
that it should not be negotiated by the payee: Knox v. Clifford, 38
Wis.
Where a note was given for an amount due the payee from the maker
on a certain contract, this was a sufficient consideration, although the
payee may have owed the maker at the time more than the face of the
note, on other contracts : Id.
One who purchases negotiable paper, before maturity, without notice,
in absolute payment of a pre-existing debt, surrendering his previous security, is protected by the law merchant against all equities of the maker
as against the payee: Id.
One who makes and puts in circulation a negotiable note, bearing
date on a secular day, is estopped, as against an innocent holder, from
showing that it was executed on Sunday : Id.
Action by Drawee to recover back from Payee the amount paid by
him.-After accepting and .paying a bill, the drawee cannot recover
back the amount of it from the payee on the ground that he had paid
it under a mistake as to the reliability of the .drawer's security, which
had proved to be fictitious: National Bank v. Burkham, S. C. Mlich.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Hawkers and Pedlers.

Delegation of Legislative Power-Conditional Enctnents.-Sect. 8
of ch. 67, Laws of 1871, provides that the owner or keeper of any dog
which shall have worried, maimed or killed any cattle, horses, sheep or
lambs, or injured any person, shall be liable to the owner or legal possessor of such cattle, &c., or to the person injured, "without proving
notice to such owner or keeper, or knowledge by him, that the dog was
mischievous or disposed to kill or worry sheep." Held, that this section
was inserted in the act in furtherance of its general objects (" to protect
and encourage the raising of sheep and discourage the raising of dogs");
and the power given in terms by sect. 9 of the act to county boards of
supervisors, to exempt their respective counties from the act, was intended to apply to said sect. 8, in the same manner as to the other provisions of the act: Slinger v. Hennsman, 38 !Wis.
The legislative power, vested by the Constitution in the Senate and
Assembly, cannot be delegated to any other body; although, in matters
purely local and municipal, the legislature may enact conditional laws,
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and permit the people or proper municipal authorities to decide whether
such laws shall have force in their respective municipalities : .ld.
Sect. 8 of the act of 1871, above recited, does not relate to municipal
affairs ; and the provisions of sect. 9 which in terms empower county
b)ards to exempt their respective counties from its operation, are void:
Id.
It appearing probable from the history of the legislation of this state
upon the subject, that the legislature would not have enacted sect. 8
unconditionally (or without some such provision as that found in sect.
9), that section cannot be upheld as valid, after sect. 9 has been adjudged void: Id.
1Military Courtsfor Trial of Civil Issues during the W1r.-The Constitution did not prohibit the creation by military authority of courts for
the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered portions of
the insurgent states. The establishment of such courts was the exercise
of the ordinary rights of conquest: Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v.
U ion Bank, 22 Wall.
A court established by proclamation of the commanding general in
New Orleans, on the 1st of May 1862, on the occupation of the city by
the government forces, though in the order establishing it called a Provost Court, and which tried civil cases, must be presumed to have been
established by the general establishing it with jurisdiction to try such
cases ; and in the absence of proof to the contrary it will be presumed
that lie acted by the consent and authorization of the President : Id.
Whether such court acted within its jurisdiction in a case where one
bank of the state of Louisiana was claiming from another bank of the
same state a large sum of money, is not a question for this court to determine, but a question exclusively for the state tribunals.
CONTRACT.

Executory-J udgment-lVTLat amounts to a collection in Equity.-Tn
1859 A. lent to B., who was largely interested in an embarrassed railroad, $5000 to buy certain judgments against the road, and B. having
bought, in 1859 and the early part of 1860, judgments to the amount
of $31,000, assigned the whole of them to A. absolutely. Subsequently,
that is to say in August, 1860, A. made a transfer (so called) of them to
B., "upon ]3.'s payment of $5000, with interest from this date ;" and
gave to B. a power of attorney of the same date, authorizing him "for
me and in my name" to dispose of them as lie might see proper. I1eld,
1st. That the so-called transfer was executory, amounting only to an offer
that if B. would pay the $5000, B. should become owner of th1'judgments; and that B. having, in May, 1861, gone south and joined the
rebels there, and not come back till 1865, could not in 1868 file a bill,
and on an allegation that A. had collected the judgments, claim the proceeds, less the $5000 and interest: French v. Hay, 22 Wall.
2. That a bill making such an allegation and such a claim was demurrable; the bill not being one of discovery, and the complainant having
complete remedy at law: Id.
3. That the road having been sold under a mortgage existing prior to
the judgments and bought by A., who, under the laws of the state
where it was, organized a new company and issued new stock, and having
VOL, XflV.-24
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'got, as an allotment to him, a quantity of such stock which he sold for
more than enough to pay the judgments-on which satisfaction was
then entered-such satisfaction was not in any sense a collection of the
judgments: 1.
4. That if it could be so considered, yet that the sale to A. having
been judicially declared void, and set aside, and the old company thus
brought again into existence, and B. so reinstated in his old ownership
of his stock in it., unimpaired by the sale, he could claim no procectds of
the judgments from A., because, if they were ever his (B.'s) by virtue
of the transfer and power of attorney, they remained his still, since no
one but the owner could enter satisfaction on them.
COURTS.

See Removal of Causes; United States Courts.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Verdict without Plea-Amendment.-The rule that a verdict in a
criminal case, where there has been neither arraignment nor plea, is a
nullity, and no judgment can be rendered upon it: Doiglass v. The
State, 3 Wis. 820, applies to a criminal prosecution for an assault and
battery: Davis v. The State, 38 Wis.
After a verdict in a criminal case, the court cannot order a plea of
"not guilty" to be entered for the defendant, without his consent, and
then render judgment against him upon the verdict - id.
DoG.
Liability of Owner.-At the common law the owner of a dog is not
liable for damages resulting from the vicious or mischievous act of the
animal, unless he had knowledge of its mischievous or vicious propensities: Slinger v. Rennsman, 38 Wis.
H]ASEMENTS.

By necessity-Adverse Exclusion by one Party gives option to other to
treat a Common Way as extinguished.-In every deed of a part of the
grantor's land, without express provision on the subject, there is an implied grant, or reservation, of easements of necessity for the enjoyment of
the part conveyed, or of the part retained: Dillman v. Hoff man, 88 Wis.
Whether, where the owner of a permanent building conveys part of
the same, dependent, for access to its upper stories, on common stairs,
passages and halls, the 'sdoctrine of casements i ways of necessity applies, or whether the conveyance of a part determines the common use
of such stairs, passages and halls, ist not here decided: Id.
If an ease ent exists in such a case, common stairs, passages and
halls whih are i part upon the estate of each party, constitute together
one entirely mtual easement, and neither party can insist upon such an
easement in the estate of the other, and at the same time obstruct the
easement in invitam on his own estate: Id
In such a case, an adverse permanent exclusion of one party by the
other upon the estate of the latter, will, at the election of the fi,rmer,
operate as an extinguishment of the mutual easement by the latter : Id.
A permanent business block, of several stories, in a city, was so built
that the only access to the stories above the ground floor was by certain
stairways and passages and a hall ; and the north one-third and south
two-thirds were afterwards conveyed to different grantees, and are now
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held in severalty by the parties to this action, the line of division being
within said hall and one of said stairways. Plaintiff's grantor, while
seized of the borth one-third, several years before this action was

brought, built, without defendant's consent, a permanent partition, ever
since maintained, enclosing within his own premises a great part of the
common hall and passages in the upper stories upon his own estate, and
removed a stairway between the second and third stories, part of the
common way, from his own premises to those of defendants, leaving a
common way, but not the same, nor one so advantageous to the defendant. The action being to restrain defendant from obstructing the
stairways and hall by building a partition wall on the line of division
between the two estates :field, that the mutual easement, if there was
one, has been extinguished by plaintiff's obstruction thereof, now ratified by defendant: Id.
EQUITY.

See Contract.

Objection to Jurisdiction- Vaiver of.-The objection that a case is

one of legal instead of equitable cognisance, may be considered waived
if not taker in the court of original jurisdiction: Wallace v. Harris,
S. C. Mich.
Where there is apparently as good ground for assigning a case to the
jurisdiction of a court of equity as to that of a court of law, it is held
not to be a matter of great consequence in which branch it falls,'especially in Michigan, where the same judge sits in both law and equity:
Id.

ESTOPPEL.

See Action.

FENCES.
Railroad-Sudden De.truction 'by Storm.-A railroad company,

though required to maintain side-fencing, is not liable for the destruc.
tion of cattle suddenly let loose upon the track through a breach in the
fencing caused by a storm, and not existing long enough to establish
negligence of the company: Robinson v. Grand Trunk Railway, S. C.
MIich.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Estoppel by-Distinct Controversies on the same saatter.-In a law-

suit involving the title to land, the plaintiff is not estopped from contesting the validity of certain foreclosure proceedings under which the
title has been obtained, by his failure to raise that question in a former
suit brought by him in chancery to set aside the mortgage as invalid:
Bonker v. Charlesworth, S. C. Mich.
One who fails to have a judgment set aside for fraud, is not debarred
from contesting at law a void execution sale by not having put it in issue
in his chancery suit: Id.
A complainant may, if he chooses, make distinct controversies on the
same matter, the subjects of separate suits : Id.
HAWKERS AND PEDLERS.

License- ConstitutionalLaw-Police Power of the State.-Sect. 7,

(h. 72, Laws of 1870, in connection with sect. 1, must be construed as
providing for the infliction of a penalty upon every person who shall be
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found travelling ",from place to place within this state for the purpose
of carrying to sell or exposing to sale any goods," etc., without having
obtained a license as hawker and pedler in the manner provided in the
act: .Monrillv. The State, 38 Wis.
It is as competent for the legislature to prohibit persons from travelling for the purpose of hawking and pedling without license, as to prohibit actual sales by hawkers and pedlers without license: Rd.
K. & N., residents of this state, were general agents of the Singer
Manufacturing Company (a corporation of another state), for the sale in
this state of sewing machines manufactured by that company; and they
received the machines from the company, in parts, at Milwaukee, and
there fitted the parts together, and tested the machines, the work requiring a shop, with machinery and tools, and the employment of several
men ; but such parts were not manufactured in this state. Held, that
the machines cannot be regarded as " manufactured within this state,"
so as to come within the exception of sect. 14 of the Act of 1870 : Id.
Laws restricting the business of hawkers and pedlers, or providing
for the licensing thereof, are an exercise of the police power of the state,
and do not lose this character by requiring: payment of the license fees
into the state treasury: Id.
The Act of 1870 being an exercise of the, police power, that provision
of the state constitution which requires uniformity of taxation is inapplicable to it. Whether, if it were an exercise of the taxing power, it
would violate the constitutional rule of uniformity by reason of the exceptions created by sect. 14, is not here determined : Id.
The legislature, under the police power, might prohibit entirely the
business of hawking and pedling; and the power to prohibit (where the
act or business is not nalum in se) includes the power to license on such
terms as the legislature may deem fit, however onerous and unequal in
fact: Id.
There is nothing in said. Act of 1870, considered as an exercise of the
police power of the state, which is in violation of the Federal Constitution : Id.
HOMESTEAD.

Loss of Home and acquisition of new one-Presumptions.-Under
the Homestead Exemption Law as amended in 1858 (Tay. Stats. 550,
§ 30), it is still only the actual home of the debtor which is exempt; and
the removal or absence which will not destroy the exemption is one for
a temporary purpose, with the certain and abiding intention of returning, and such as is not inconsistent with the fact that the premises still
remain the residence of the owner: Jarvis v. Moe, 38 Wis.
A person cannot have two homes at the same time ; and such a removal as gains a new home is an abandonment of the old : Id.
The presumption is that a person is at home where he is found living;
but this presumption may Id.
be rebutted by showing his abode temporary,
and his home elsewhere:
The presumption that a person who removes with his family from one
dwelling-house to another, owned by himself, does so animo manendi,
may be rebutted by circumstances and conditions of the removal, or declarations accompanying it, manifesting a temporary purpose in such
removal and an intention to return; but cannot be satisfactorily rebutted
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by professions made only after intervening occurrences had made a return advantageous : d.
The intention which is sufficient to rebut such presumption must be
positive, and certain, not conditional or indefinite : Id.
Plaintiff removed from his former home without manifesting any intention to return to it, renting it to other persons, and moving with his
family into another building owned by him in the same city, for the
purpose of keeping a hotel in such building. He now claims that he
did .this for the purpose of establishing the hotel and keeping it until
he could rent or sell it, and of then returning to his former home. He.
remained in the hotel eighteen months, leaving it only when it became
obvious that he could not maintain his title to it against encumbrances
upon it; and his testimony tends to show that had his hotel keeping
prospered, lie would have continued it indefinitely, unlesg lie could have
sold or rented the property to his satisfaction. Held, that he must be
regarded as having acquired a new residence, on his hotel property,
abandoning his former homestead, and cannot now hold the latter premises exempt from the lien of a judgment recovered against him after
his removal and before his return to them: Id.
INFANT.

Voidable Contract-Acts amounting to Ratification.-Where the defences in foreclosure were, that there was no valid consideration for the
notes and mortgages in suit, and that the mortgagors were infants when
the instruments were made, it appeared that the mortgage was for
purchase-mopey of the land, and that the mortgagors were in possession,
and there was no offer by them to restore the land. .eld, 1. That these
facts were conclusive evidence of a valid consideration : 2. That, treating the conveyance of the land to defendants and their execution of the
notes and mortgage for the purchase-money, as one transaction, it was
voidable by them, but not void; and their electing to retain possession
of the land after reaching their majority, was a ratificationof the whole
contract, which made it binding upon them: Callis v. Day, 38 Wis.
JUDICIAL SALE.

Control of Court over.-Where a judicial sale has been made on void
process, the court may, while the purchase-money remains in the hands
of the sheriff, on the application of the purchaser, set aside the sale and
order the purchase-money to be refunded: Dowell v. Goode, 25 Ohio.
LICENSE.

See Hawkers and Pedlers.

LiDIUTATIONS, STATUTE OF.

PartialPayment by one of several Debtors.-A partial payment on a
joint and several promissory note, by one of several makers, will not
prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations as to the other
maker: Hance, Executor, v. Mlair et al., 25 Ohio.
Lis'PENDENS.
Suit in Admiralty is not.-Pendeney of a suit in admiralty does not
bar the institution of a suit at common law on the same subject, nor authorize a stay of proceedings therein. The principle of Granger v.
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Wayne Circuit Jtudye, 27 Mich. 405, is re-asserted: Murphy v. Granger, S. C. Mich.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Issue of Action for-Malice-Advice of Counsel.-The true inquiry
in an action for malicious prosecution is not what the actual facts were,
and whether they would authorize the arrest., but what the defendants
had reason to believe and did believe were the acts: Gallaway v. Burr,
S. C. Mich.
In a prosecution for obtaining goods under false pretences, the plainiiff need not have actual personal knowledge! of the facts, but if he honestly believes them to be true, he may rely on such statements, received
through the usual channels, as business men of ordinary prudence would
act upon : Id.
The institution of a criminal prosecution for the recovery of a private
claim is strong, if not conclusive evidence of malice; if this is the
motive, the advice of counsel is no protection : .d.
NEGLIGENCE.

Railroad-Iyury to Passengers.-Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters
181, affirmed; and on a suit for injury to persons, against a railway
company carrying passengers, the doctrine again declared to be that if
the passenger is in the exercise of that degree of care which may reasonably be expected from a person in his situation, and injury occur to
him, this is prima facie evidence of the carrier's liability: Railroad
Company v. Pollard,22 Wall.
Whether a passenger in a rail-car, standing up in it, when getting
into the station-house, at the close of the journey, but before an actual
stoppage of a car, is guilty of negligence in the circumstances of the
case, is a question of fact for the jury to decide under proper instructions : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Set-off of Debt due one Partner.-Inan action on a promissory note,'
made by defendants in their firm name and !fora partnership debt, they
cannot offset an account against plaintiff in, favor of another firm, now
owned by one of the defendants: Wilson v. Runkel and another,38 Wis.
RAILROAD.

See Fences; _regligence.

REMOVAL OP CAUSES.

Jurisdiction- VTcating Judgment of State Court after Removal.-A.
filed a bill against B., a purchaser of property at a sale made by C., a
trustee to sell, charging both B. and C. with collusion and fraud in the
sale, and praying discovery from both parties, that the sale might be set
aside, &e., and that B., who had taken possession of the property, might
be charged with its rents, but not making Iuch a prayer as to C. Both
13. and C. appeared and answered. The court charged B. with rents, but
did not charge C. B. appealed, and the decree charging him being
affirmed, and a master having reported to the inferior court the amount
of rents, a final decree was there made against B. for them. At the same
time that this decree was made (B. being insolvent), the complainant
asked and got leave to file an amended bill against the two parties; Mr.
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D., an attorney of the court, appearing in court-but without any authority from C.-and consenting that such a bill should be filed. The
amended bill was accordingly filed, alleging that B. was insolvent; that
C. was chargeable for the rents as well as B., and that both were
chargeable for use of certain furniture on the premises when B. entered
them. Neither B. nor C. apparently had actual knowledge.of the filing
of this bill; and a decree was entered, pro confisso, against C., for both
the value of the rents and the injury to the furniture. On C. getting
knowledge of this decree, it was vacated, and, notwithstanding opposition by him, a decree for rents was entered, leaving the case open as to
both parties in respect to the furniture. B. and C. then answered as to
the whole case. Subsequently (being entitled as respected citizenship
to do so) they removed the case into the Circuit Court of the United
States, under the Act of March 2d 1867, which court set aside all the
decrees in the state court, and ordering that the case should stand for
hearing on bill, answer and pleadings, opened the entire suit as if nothing
had been done anywhere else in any part of it. C. answered, denying all the material allegations of all the bills; and testimony being
taken, no proof of their truth appeared as to him. The Circuit Court
annulled the decrees in toto in the state court against both B. and C.,
and dismissed the whole bill. A. appealed to this court. Held,
1. That the decree against B. was wrongly vacated ; that as to him
the decree in the state court on the original bill for rents was re3 jwdicata; and that that decree stood as though no amended bill had been
filed, and unimpeachable as to everything covered by it; while as to th6
other matter (the damage to the furniture), the Circuit Court of the
United States should, by issue directed to a jury, or by reference to a
master, have ascertained it and have decreed accordingly:* French,
Trustee, v. Hay et aL, 22 Wall.
2. That the state court committed a gross error in entering a decree
against C. for rents, on the amended bill, where the original bill had not
prayed that he should be charged with them, and that his answer denying, as it did, all the material allegations of both bills against him, and
those allegations being otherwise unsupported, the decree of the state
court was, as to him, rightly vacated, and the bill, as to him, rightly
dismissed: Id.
When a case has been removed from a state court, into the Circuit
Court of the United States, under one of the Acts of Congress relating
to such removal of eases (in this case the act was that of March 2d
1867), an objection that the act has not been complied with in respect
of time and other important particulars, will not be listened to in this
court, the point not having been made in the court below until three
years after the removal made, and when the testimony was all taken and
the case ready for hearing. Nor ought it under such circumstances to
have been listened to in the Circuit Court. It came too late, and must
be held to have been conclusively waived: Id.
Loss of Original Papers-Presumptionas to Jitrisdiction.-Where
the Statutes of the United States authorizing a removal into the Circuit
Court of the United States, of a cause brought originally in the courts
of a state, require that the parties to the suit shall be citizens of different
states, and where a cause has been removed from a state court to a circuit court, and all the papers in it have been afterwards destroyed by

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

fire, and the parties then, by writing filed in the Circuit Court, admit
that the cause was brought to the Circuit Court by transfer -from the
state court, in accordance with the statutes in such case provided, and
-being now anxious apparently only to get to trial--simply ask and get
leave to file a declaration and plea as substitutes for the ones originally
filed and now destroyed,-in such case this court will, in the absence of
all proof to the contrary, presume that the citizenship requisite to give
the Circuit Court jurisdiction was shown in some proper manner; though
it be not apparent on the mere pleadings: Railway Co. v. Ramsey. 22
Wall.
Jurisdictionof Federal Courts over Collateral Suits.-When in a case
which is properly removed from a state court, under one of the Acts of
Congress relating to removals, into the Circuit Court of the United
States, a complainant getting a decree in the State Court and sending a
transcript of it into another state, sues the defendant on it there, the
Circuit Court into which the case is removed may enjoin the complainant from proceedings in any such or other distant court until it hears
the case ; and if, after hearing, it annuls the decree in the state court,
and dismisses, as wanting equity, the bill on which the decree was made,
may make the injunction perpetual: French, Trustee, v. Hay, 22 Wall.
STATUTE.

Construction.-In construing a statute, the punctuation is entitled to
small consideration : Morrillv. The State, 38 Wis.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

Jurisdictionby Consent.-Although consent of the parties to a suit
cannot give jurisdiction to the courts of the: United States, the parties
may admit the existence of facts which show jurisdiction, and the courts
may act judicially upon such an admission : Railway Oo. v. Ramsay,
22 Wall.
USURY.

Sipdated Rate-.7udgment.-Under the Act of May 4th 1869, parties may stipulate in a note for any rate of interest not exceeding 8 per
cent. per annum, and such note, after maturity, without an express
agreement to that effect, will continue to bear the stipulated rate until
payment: Marietta Iron Works et al. v. Lottimer, 25 Ohio.
A judgment taken on such a note for the amount due, including unpaid interest, will bear the stipulated rate of interest only, without
rests, until payment: Id.
WITNESS.

Party-Deosition.-Incourts of the United States under section
858 of the Revised Statutes, which enact (with a proviso excepting to a
certain extent, suits by or against executors, administrators or guardians)
that in those courts, no witness shall be excluded in any civil action
because he is a party to or interested in the issue tried, parties to a civil
suit (the suit not being one of the sort excepted by or against executors
or guardians), may testify by deposition as well as orally, there being,
under the Act of Congress, no difference between them and other
persons having no interest in the suit: Railroad Co. v. Pollard, 22
Wall.

